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Prevention oftransmission of HIV infection is the most important public health concern of the
AIDS epidemic. To date, unfortunately, we have failed to contain the epidemic. The increasingly
rapid spread of HIV into the IV drug-abusing population and subsequent heterosexual transmis-
sion represent a further failure of the public health system. Current organization of the public
health programs, especially the lack of independence and adequate financial and personnel
support, is an extremely serious problem. More funding may not be the answer, unless there is
better organization. Identification of infected individuals and a vigorous education program must
be implemented. HIV antibody-positive individuals should be followed carefully in order to
evaluate the risk factors for AIDS and efficacy ofspecific interventions.
At the 1986 meeting of the American College of Epidemiology, a Policy Statement
was prepared which urged screening and education for individuals at high risk of
human immune deficiency virus (HIV) infection. There was considerable concern at
the meeting about the efficacy of screening, even when combined with an educational
effort to modify certain risk behaviors. Two issues were noted: (1) there was no
evidence that screening would lead to modification ofbehavior, and (2) individuals who
screened negative for HIV antibody might actually increase their high-risk behavior.
There are no well-designed clinical trials that will be able to answer either of these
two important questions. A randomized trial would have to compare the effects of
education alone, education plus screening, and screening alone. It is unlikely, in the
context ofthe AIDS epidemic and the serious risks associated with HIV infection, that
such a trial will be completed in the immediate future. It is likely, therefore, that
approaches to the control ofthe epidemic will be in place without well-designed clinical
trials to evaluate the various methods ofprevention.
In 1986, we reviewed the epidemic ofacquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
and described it as a failure of public health policy [1]. The public health failure
consisted ofthree types. First was the inability todeal with a rising and very substantial
epidemic of venereal diseases in the high-risk populations prior to the introduction of
HIV. "Very early in the epidemic, physicians who had been working in the homosexual
community noted thethree key risk factors related to the introduction and rapid spread
of infection; (1) a high frequency of other sexually transmitted diseases within a
subpopulation of homosexual men; (2) the subpopulation characterized by having
multiple sex contacts, and (3) the frequency ofanal intercourse."
The second public health failure was the inability to marshal resources early in the
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epidemic, soon after the mode of transmission had been reasonably well defined, so as
to contain and reduce the likelihood of spread within the high-risk populations. The
more recent, third public health failure has clearly been the current inability to
organize an effective national public health program to prevent transmission of HIV to
other high-risk groups. The rapid spread of infection into the drug-abuse population is
the clear example ofthe public health failures. It is hoped that the fourth public health
failure will not be the further spread of HIV into lower-risk heterosexual populations.
We noted in our previous paper that the failure of public health measures to control
the epidemic was not due to the quality of the official public health services at both the
federal and state levels, but rather to the lack ofavailable resources and the substantial
social and political restrictions placed on public health officials in their attempts to
control the epidemic.
The primary goal of public health for controlling the AIDS epidemic must be the
reduction of new infection with HIV. Any public health program must be based on
some estimate of the prevalence of infection in the community, the size of the
population at risk, and the type of behaviors likely to result in transmission of HIV. At
least three risk groups can be described.
1. High-risk but uninfected individuals, such as drug abusers and homosexual men
living in high-prevalence communities
2. Lower-risk but very susceptible groups such as the heterosexual contacts of
intravenous (IV) drug abusers in high-prevalence communities, homosexuals, and IV
drug abusers in lower-prevalence communities
3. Heterosexuals outside the very high-risk communities: Epidemics will occur
either because of introduction and spread of the virus by IV drug abuse or through
heterosexual contacts of bisexual men.
Control of the epidemic requires a decrease in the transmission of HIV in the
population. Protection of the uninfected at-risk population must therefore be the
highest priority.
Most individuals capable of transmitting HIV infection can be identified by specific
serological blood tests. Recently, there has been considerable concern about the
relatively long period of time before seroconversion of infected individuals and the
probability that during this time they are capable of transmitting the disease to other
individuals [2]. Clearly, no serological test is going to be perfect. The absence of
antibodies or antigen in the blood is not definitive proof that an individual will not
transmit the virus. It is likely, however, that most individuals capable of transmitting
infection can be identified by having a positive antibody test verified by sero-
immunological methods.
The modes of transmission of the virus are well defined [3]. Very few infections
occur outside the high-risk groups. There is no evidence, at the present time, that
transmission of HIV is occurring or will occur in the vast majority ofindividuals in the
United States belonging to lower-risk categories. The majority of the at-risk but
uninfected population can be identified as the spouses and other heterosexual contacts
of IV drug abusers, uninfected IV drug abusers, uninfected homosexuals, spouses of
hemophiliac men, and the offspring ofinfected women.
The behavioral changes required to reduce substantially the risk ofinfection can also
be reasonably well described. All the tools necessary for control of this epidemic exist
now and have existed in the past. Implementation ofan effective public health program
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should be the major concern. Several steps are required in order to control the
epidemic.
First is the need for good management. The HIV epidemic crosses state as well as
national boundaries. Effective management must initially begin at the federal level
and clearly requires a plan to decrease transmission of HIV in the community,
including the allocation of necessary resources for implementation of the plan. This
requisite does not mean that every decision regarding the programs to control HIV
infection must be made at the federal level, but rather that the overall structure must
bedeveloped centrally in collaboration with the state and related health agencies.
Second, surveillance of infection must be a major component of the program. The
successful intervention strategies to reduce transmission depend on an understanding
ofthesizeofthe infectedpopulation, itscharacteristics, and the potential magnitude of
those at risk of infection. The probability ofinfection is clearly due to exposure to the
virus, a function ofthe number of individuals infected in a community, and the types
andfrequency ofbehaviors likely to result in transmission ofthe virus.
Surveillancerequires the measurement ofboth prevalence and the incidence of new
infections in a defined population. The Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Studies (MACS)
of homosexual men, although not organized as a surveillance project, represent one
possible approach to surveillance [4]. The research project has enrolled homosexual
men in alongitudinalstudy and measured bothprevalence and incidence ofsubsequent
infection, as well as the determinants of the modes of transmission within the defined
population. Clearly, such studies, as is the case in MACS, must be combined with
educational programs to reduce transmission ofinfection.
Anotherapproach to surveillance has been utilized by Winkelstein and others in San
Francisco in which they have sampled from a high-risk defined population [6].
Surveillance of AIDS cases is clearly no substitute for the measurement of incidence
and prevalence of HIV in a community. The prevalence of infection in a community
will provide important information with regard to the subsequent screening and
educationalprograms. The incidenceofinfection isthe best measure ofthe successes or
failures ofour educational prevention programs.
There is much to gain for those individuals who are infected in terms of these
surveillance projects. Onlythrough careful observation ofinfected asymptomatic and
symptomatic individuals can thespecific factors that result in AIDS and the potential
forintervention toreducetherisks ofdeveloping AIDS be identified [5]. The argument
that individuals who are infected gain nothing by participating in either screening or
surveillance is fallacious.
The third component is education, which must be primarily oriented to high-risk
individuals. The number one priority for educational programs must be individuals
who are already infected, since obviously it is these individuals who alone will
perpetuate theepidemic. These educational programs must be of two types. First, we
mustmodify or eliminate those behaviors which result in the transmission of the virus.
It is hard to believe that there are not enough funds provided in New York City and
other communities adequately to staffdrug-abuse treatment programs or enough case
workers toprovide education within acommunity in which the prevalence of infection
is soextraordinarilyhigh and the risks oftransmission to the heterosexual population a
reality.
Thesecondcomponentofeducation istoreducethepossibilityoftransmission, given
that a specific risk behavior is still practiced. The use of condoms, sterile needles,
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various solutions that may result in partial sterilization of needles, and so on are
examples of specific educational opportunities. Training of individuals to work in the
high-risk populations should be a top priority. Until we can demonstrate that the
incidence of new infection is declining in a specific community in relation to our
educational program, we must presume that the educational effort has not been
successful and that more resources will be required.
Education of the low-risk, vast majority of the public about the risk of HIV is
probably of little value. The prevention of drug abuse is clearly a worthwhile
educational goal, whether or not there was a HIV epidemic in the IV drug abuse
population. Emphasis in educational programs with regard to specific sexual behaviors
may be ofrelatively little value. It is probably unlikely that such educational messages
reach either the infected individual or the high-risk populations, or that such groups
are not already aware ofthe problems associated with specific sexual behaviors and the
risks of infection. The HIV epidemic is not going to be resolved by the elimination of
premarital sex or major educational programs to reduce the number of sexual partners
among the vast numbers of low-risk individuals in the United States.
The fourth required step is the development of a screening program. A screening
program must be limited only to high-risk populations; it must also be combined with
theeducational program. The basic goal ofa screening program is primarily to identify
infected individuals likely to transmit the disease. The success of any screening
program will clearly depend on the prevalence ofinfection in the community. If 60-70
percent of the individuals in a specific community are infected, then screening
programs are going to be of little value, since it would be more logical to presume that
all individuals in the high-risk population are infected. On the other hand, in many
communities where the rates of infection may only be as high as 20 or 30 percent, the
identification of infected individuals and a major educational effort oriented to them
may have substantial benefit. The primary reason for the screening effort is to focus
the educational programs on the highest-risk infected individuals. If there were
unlimited resources for the educational programs, then one might reasonably argue
that screening to identify HIV-infected individuals might be of limited value, since it
could only serve as a further educational tool to change behavior. We do not, however,
have unlimited resources for our educational program, and, therefore, much of our
effort must be oriented to individuals likely to transmit the disease. The major
educational activitynow, for the general public, is to change their attitude, to be able to
point out to them that the epidemic remains confined to a relatively small cohort which
can be identified, and that the specific modes oftransmission are well defined.
Screening should be an active process in the community; that is, it should reach out
into the high-risk community, along with the educational efforts. It should not be
punitive in the sense that those individuals who are identified as being infected must
not lose rights unrelated to the risk oftransmission ofthe virus.
In most situations, screening should be voluntary. The ability to increase the
percentage ofhigh-risk individuals who are screened should be one ofthe measures ofa
successful health education program. There are situations, however, where screening
should be mandatory because of the grave risk to the population. The risk of
heterosexual transmission by IV drug abuse is so high, with the further potential of
infecting newborns, that there may be a strong rationale to test all identified IV drug
abusers. Vigorous education and treatment would be provided for those screened
positive, with follow-up of their heterosexual contacts. There may be justification for
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testing all prisoners because of the potential for infection of other prisoners. The
military service currently tests all new recruits; this precaution is probablyjustified on
the basis ofpotential risks.
Screening of pregnant women may become important if methods become available
to prevent transmission in utero. Such mandatory screening would then bejustified to
protect the newborn.
There also may be strong indications for testing in sexual disease clinics. The
populations of these clinics are at high risk. Again, the goal would be education and
potential treatment to both prevent transmission of HIV and AIDS disease. Manda-
tory as well as voluntary testing should not be performed in the absence of a
combination ofeducation and follow-up programs.
It is important to relegate to the farthest-back burner the often noted fear that
individuals at risk will hide in order to avoid being tested. We seem to haveremarkably
little respect for some basic intelligence among those possibly infected with HIV or for
the large number of individuals trained in behavioral sciences and health education
who are supposed to possess the skills necessary to overcome these fears ofscreening.
One ofthe key unanswered questions is how todeal with infected individuals who are
non-responsive to the educational efforts. How do we deal with an infected IV drug
abuser with frequent heterosexual partners, infecting women in the community? If
these women are ofchildbearing age, then there is the increased likelihood ofinfecting
newborns. Should this individual be considered such a danger to society that he should
be isolated or quarantined from the at-risk population?
One ofthe key arguments noted against screening is that the individual identified as
infected has nothing to gain because there is no treatment. This argument makes little
sense. The only way that we will understand the specific links between infection and
disease is by observing and carefully following those individuals who are infected and
testing various methods to prevent the development of AIDS. Therefore, individuals
who are infected gain potentially the greatest benefit by being carefully monitored;
their only hope of avoiding death due to AIDS is identification of some method to
prevent the progression from infection to disease.
It is important, on the other hand, to protect the rights of the infected individual
against the unwarranted intrusion of society, at least within the context of the risk of
HIV transmission. The issue of confidentiality is constantly used to delay the
implementation ofeffective screening, surveillance, and educational programs. One of
the unfortunate problems that may be occurring is that the issue ofconfidentiality may
increase the public's concern about the epidemic and lead to such hysteria that
restrictions on behavior and lifestyles will be placed on the entire high-risk population,
on every homosexual or every IV drug abuser, on the presumption that they are
infected and capableoftransmitting thevirus unless provenotherwise. Onecould carry
this attitude even further; a CDC study tried to estimate the size of the at-risk
homosexual population in New York by counting all men over 15 or so in New York
who were unmarried as "at-risk of being homosexual" until proven otherwise [7].
Worse, we may reach a situation where every young Hispanic male in New York is
considered an IV drug abuser and infected, until proven otherwise, and will, therefore,
not be hired for a job or allowed to participate in certain social, educational, and
recreational activities.
Another concern about screening is the number of false positives that may be
identified by the initial ELISA test [8]. The number of false positives is a function of
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the prevalence of infection in the community. Screening programs should only be
oriented to high-risk populations, not the general public. Testing as a requirement for
marriage licenses, hospital admissions, and so on is not of value. All positives should
clearly be further evaluated with more sensitive and specific tests. The false-positive
rate will be extremely high when testing is done in low-risk populations. A further
concern about testing is, as noted, the false sense of security given to individuals who
may be HIV-negative, but yet at high risk. Individuals defined as high-risk must be
educated about the possibility that they are infected, that they have not yet become
antibody-positive, and that they still have a risk of becoming infected even if their
sexual or IV drug abuse behaviors are limited to individuals who are also HIV-
negative, unless the partners have no historical evidence ofbeing exposed to any ofthe
high-risk behaviors.
There are, as was stated at the beginning ofthis paper, no clinical trials to evaluate
theefficacy ofscreening combined with education. It is doubtful whether we can spend
years designing and implementing clinical trials to evaluate screening and education.
The primary function ofscreening should be to identify the infected individuals so that
the limited resources for education and follow-up can be used for this high-risk
population.
An infected individual must retain all rights that are not specifically related to risk
oftransmission ofthevirus or the likelihood ofdeveloping clinical disease based on the
best current scientific knowledge. Infected individuals do not have a right to infect
others by blood transfusion or blood products, heterosexual or homosexual relations, or
by injection. Theydo have theright toworkin mostsituations, to go toschool, not to be
identified as infected, except perhaps to those specifically at risk ofbecoming infected
by them. It is important that public health officials balance the rights of the infected
individual with those ofthe uninfected who wish to remain that way.
The decision as to any restriction of activities of the infected individuals must be
made by public health officials and documented as to the reason for specific restriction,
not as part ofthe perception ofrisk by individuals who do not understand the mode of
transmission ofthe virus.
The American Medical Association [9], as well as other health groups [10,11], has
recently supported at least some level of screening along with education. They
remained concerned about the protection of individual privacy and the risk that
HIV-positive individuals will be ostracized from society. Public health officials must
overcome this problem by vigorously supporting legislation and social policy that will
protect the rights ofthe infected individual.
The HIV epidemic in the United States has raised three important and unanswered
questions about the implementation ofpublic health programs. The first is the balance
between the individual's rights and the protection of the at-risk community. HIV
infection results in a fatal disease. Does an individual known to be infected have the
right to practice behaviors which will probably infect and kill other individuals? Do
individuals who are known to be at high risk have the right to refuse testing and
subsequent educational efforts because it may infringe on their individual freedoms?
The American Medical Association now believes that a physician probably has the
responsibility to notify the spouse of a HIV-infected heterosexual individual but
remains concerned about the legal ramifications of a breach of confidentiality [9]. If
we believe that the spouse ofa heterosexual infected individual should be advised, then
why not the partner ofa homosexual infected individual? Ifwe are to notify the sexual
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partners of both heterosexual and homosexual individuals, should we then also be
responsible for notifying those individuals who share needles with an infected drug
addict? Ifwedid not know who was infected, such problems would not be relevant, and
the epidemic could continue to run its rapid course within the community.
The second issue relates to the responsibility for the management and control of
epidemics and the proper role of federal, state, and local agencies. The current AIDS
epidemic emphasizes the need for a strong federal public health agency. On the other
hand, there are unique regional situations which may be better served at the state or
local level. The epidemic should make us review carefully both the size and the quality
ofavailable public health resources at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as the
ability to implement these resources in times ofmajor epidemics.
Last and perhaps most important is the role of public health officials and their
ability to act independent oftheusual political processes. One ofthe major problems in
dealing with the HIV epidemic and the AIDS cases is the continued politicization of
health education and the public health efforts to control the epidemic [12]. In the
United States, we no longer have a strong, independent Public Health Service. The
Surgeon General of the United States has, perhaps, acted more forcefully than any
federal official in this epidemic, but his powers are extremely limited [13].
The continued efforts by elected officials to decide on the proper educational format
and programs based on a desire tosatisfy theirconstituencies ratherthan on the need to
control the epidemic raise serious questions about the ability to control both current
and future epidemics in the United States [14]. Would it be more rational toconsider a
reorganization of public health activities in the United States, so that a semi-
independent Public Health Service, headed by theSurgeon General, was responsible to
the executive and legislative bodies in the same way as the Federal Reserve Board or
the Controller General and the General Accounting Office?
The Surgeon General in this model would have the primary responsibility (1) to
identify an epidemic as a substantial threat to public health; (2) to establish the
necessary procedures tocontrol theepidemic within thebounds ofour legal safeguards;
and (3) to have the power to marshal resources in terms ofboth personnel and money to
control the epidemic. This change will require the availability ofpersonnel not only for
surveillance and laboratory support, such as the Centers for Disease Control, but also
trained personnel to provide preventive, public health services. (4) The Surgeon
General should coordinate the requests for further funds and their distribution in order
to combat the epidemic. Such an approach does not weaken the role of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), for example, but instead would provide a more equitable
distribution of funds to control the epidemic, including research in etiology, vaccine
development, and drug therapy, as well asgood public health preventive programs. It is
unlikely that a drug-treatment program is going to have the same ability to obtain
funds for control of IV drug abuse and transmission of HIV as a more sophisticated
research unit at one of our universities. Clearly there is a need to coordinate services
and research based on the need to control the epidemic. This task must be the primary
responsibility of the head of a professional public health service. The implementation
ofsuch a plan would also require upgrading ofthe standards for public health practice
at both the federal and state levels.
It is clear that neither the executive or the legislative branches of government can
deal with the behavioral interventions and educational efforts that are necessary to
control the current HIV epidemic by manipulating the system on almost a day-to-day
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basis [15]. Pouring more money into the AIDS program will not solve problems unless
there is both a good organization and an adequate plan based on an understanding of
the epidemic and methods ofcontrol.
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